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IMMIGRANTS, ALIENS, AND THE CONSTITUTION
And if a stranger sojourn with thee in your land, ye shall not vex him.
But the stranger that dwelleth with you shall be unto you as one born among
you, and thou shalt love him as thyself; for ye were strangers in the land
of Egypt....
Leviticus, xix, 33:34.
In three recent cases, the Supreme Court has expanded the constitutional
protections accorded to aliens. In Graham v. Richardson,1 the Court struck
down a state statute which limited welfare benefits to U.S. citizens. Such a re-
striction was held to violate equal protection, and the Court stated that classi-
fications on the basis of alienage are "inherently suspect and are therefore sub-
ject to strict judicial scrutiny whether or not a fundamental right is impaired."2
The Court also reaffirmed that constitutional standards apply to state action in
the granting of a privilege which the state may refuse altogether, as in the case
of welfare.'
In Sugarman v. Dougall,4 the Court applied this same argument in striking
down a New York statute which limited employment in the competitive civil
service to citizens. The Court held that "a fiat ban on the employment of aliens
in positions that have little, if any, relation to a State's legitimate interest, cannot
withstand scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment."5
In In re GrIffiths,0 the Court held to be violative of equal protection a state
bar rule which prohibited the admission to the bar of aliens. "In order to justify
the use of a suspect classification," said the Court, "a State must show that its
purpose or interest is both constitutionally permissible and substantial, and that
its use of the classification is 'necessary to the accomplishment' of its purpose or
the safeguarding of its interest."17 Restriction of the bar to citizens was held not
to be necessary to safeguard the interests of the people of the state or of the state
itself. The holdings of these cases may be stated briefly as follows:
1. Classifications based on alienage are inherently suspect and subject
to close judicial scrutiny.
2. Such a classification must be for a constitutional purpose and the
purpose or interest involved must be a substantial one.
3. The classification must be necessary to the accomplishment of the
legislative purpose.
4. These tests of the classification apply whether the benefit to the
alien which is involved can be considered a "right" or a "privilege."
The holdings in these cases, taken together, call into question much of the
present law concerning aliens. In particular, they provide the basis for a broad
1 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
2 403 U.S. at 376.
3 403 U.S. at 374.
4 93 S.Ct. 2842 (1973).
5 93 S.Ct. at 2850.
6 93 S.Ct. 2851 (1973).
7 93 S.Ct. at 2855.
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reinterpretation of the constitutional rights of immigrants to the United States
and other resident aliens at all stages of the immigration process. Re-examination
of the rights of immigrants in proceedings to naturalize has been considered
elsewhere.' This article examines the impact of these cases on three other areas:
admission of immigrants and other aliens, the civil rights of resident aliens, and
the rights of aliens in proceedings to deport.
I. The Right of Entry
The early history of immigration in the United States was one of admission
without restriction. Immigrants could enter freely, and in some cases there was
encouragement of immigration by state and federal governments.' The Supreme
Court forbade the states from limiting and regulating immigration, e., by levy-
ing landing taxes,"0 on the grounds that such a tax was an interference with for-
eign commerce' and that such regulation was vested in Congress."
The first act of Congress restricting immigration, passed in 1875,"s excluded
prostitutes and convicts. Later statutes excluded idiots, lunatics, and those likely
to become public charges.' 4 In 1882, Congress passed the first act excluding
Chinese immigration," and since that time has been active in legislating restric-
tions on immigration. 8 It has barred immigration on grounds of political
opinions;" and, under the quota system, first adopted in 1921,'" fostered an
explicitly racial and eugenic scheme of immigration aimed at encouraging immi-
gration from northern and western Europe rather than southern and eastern
Europe and Asia, while at the same time placing a fixed limit on yearly immi-
gration.'" Racial quotas were not dropped until 1965 by an act which replaced
exclusion on racial grounds with a preference system.2" Under this system pref-
8 Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Naturalization Power, 80 YALE L.J. 769 (1971).
9 E.g., An Act to Encourage Immigration, ch. 246, 13 Stat. 385 (1864). This act
permitted employers to pay the passage and bind the services of prospective migrants. In the
1870's, at the height of competition for migrants, western and southern states used promo-
tional agents and other inducements to attract immigrants. Higham, American Immigration
Policy in Historical Perspective, 21 LAW & CONTEMP. PRon. 213, 215 (1956).
10 Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. 282 (1849); accord, Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92
U.S. 259 '(1875); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1875); cf., New York v. Miln, 36
U.S. (11 Pet.) 71 (1837).
11 Id.
12 The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
13 Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477.
14 Act of August 3, 1882, ch. 376, § 2, 22 Stat. 214.
15 Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58. Other exclusion acts were passed within the
next few years. Act of July 5, 1884, ch. 220. 23 Stat. 115; and Act of Sept. 13, 1888, ch.
1015, 25 Stat. 476.
16 See e.g., A. SCHwARTZ, THE OPEN SoCIErY (1967); Higham, American Immigration
Policy in Historical Perspective, 21 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 213 (1956).
17 Act of March 3, 1903, ch. 1012, § 2, 32 Stat. 1213. This act provided for exclusion of
"anarchists, or persons who believe in or advocate the overthrow by force or violence of the
government of the United States, or of all government, or of all forms of law, or the assassina-
tion of public officials" '(emphasis added).
18 Act of May 19, 1921, ch. 8, 42 Stat. 5; Act of May 26, 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153.
19 M. KONviTz, THE ALIEN AND THE AsIATIC IN AMERICAN LAW 29-33 (1946). The
effect of the law was to severely restrict immigration from southern and eastern Europe, while
leaving that from northern and western European countries unaffected. Earlier legislation had
barred virtually all Asiatic immigration, Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 2, 39 Stat. 874; and to
this exclusion was added exclusion of the Japanese in violation of the Gentlemen's Agreement
of 1907. Id. at 22-29.
20 Act of Oct. 3, 1965, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-55 (1970).
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erence is given to relatives of citizens and resident aliens, and an immigrant is
not barred on grounds of race or national origin. If he is entering to work he
must establish that he will not compete with present workers."'
The courts have upheld this changing pattern of restrictive legislation.
Initially the power to restrict and regulate immigration was found in the com-
merce clause.22 Later cases, however, stated that the federal power to exclude
or deport aliens was plenary and derived from inherent powers of sovereignty.m
This theory was first set out in The Chinese Exclusion Case.24 That case involved
a Chinese laborer who had lived in San Francisco for 12 years. He obtained a
certificate of re-entry issued pursuant to the Chinese exclusion statutes25 and left
for China. Upon his return to San Francisco, he was denied entry on the grounds
that an act of Congress,2" passed after he had left China but before his arrival
in the U.S., had annulled the certificate and abrogated his right to return. Justice
Field, speaking for a unanimous Court, upheld the exclusion. The Court
admitted that the act of Congress upon which exclusion was based violated the
express terms of treaties between the U.S. and China;27 the act, however, was
held to have superseded those treaty provisions, which provided that the United
States could not completely ban Chinese immigration." Justice Field went on
to argue that the power to exclude was a "sovereign [power], restricted in [its]
exercise only by the Constitution itself and considerations of public policy and
justice which control, more or less, the conduct of all civilized nations."2 If
Congress "considers the presence of foreigners of a different race in this country,
who will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its peace and security,"" it
may exclude them even in time of peace, and this exclusion will be conclusive
on the judiciary. Justice Field saw the congressional action to be justified by the
"well-founded apprehension.., that a limitation to the immigration of certain
classes from China was essential to the peace of the community on the Pacific
Coast, and possibly to the preservation of our civilization there."" The Court,
in the broadest terms, upheld the right to exclude any aliens, even though the
basis for exclusion be racial discrimination. 2 This same plenary power was later
applied to deportation. 3
21 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (14)'(1970).
22 The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
23 Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 40
(1924); Keller v. United States, 213 U.S. 138, 143-144 (1909); United States ex rel. Turner
v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 294 (1904); Fok Yung Yo v. United States, 185 U.S. 296, 302
(1902); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892); The Chinese Exclusion
Case, 130 U.S. 581, 609 '(1889).
24 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
25 Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, § 4, 22 Stat. 58.
26 Act of Oct. 1, 1888, ch. 1064, § 2, 25 Stat. 504.
27 130 U.S. at 600.
28 130 U.S. at 600.
29 130 U.S. at 604.
30 130 U.S. at 606.
31 130 U.S. at 594.
32 A Chinese resident in California was subject to other legal restrictions at this time: he
paid special taxes, he was excluded from schools, he could not vote, and he could not testify
in court for or against a Caucasian. He was harassed by discriminatory legislation, as seen in
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). As Senator Hoar replied to justice Field's argu-
ment that the Chinese would not assimilate, "it takes two to assimilate." M. KoNvrrZ, THE
ALIEN AND THE AsIATIc IN AiERICAN LAW 10 (1946).
33 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). Justice Brewer dissented in
(Vol. 49:1075] 1077NOTES
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The plenary power to exclude has been held to mean that an alien seeking
admission has no substantive rights under the Constitution. Exclusion has been
upheld where based on race'4 and where based on political opinion."5 An immi-
grant seeking admission has also been denied virtually all procedural rights. If
held in custody, an alien may bring a suit in habeus corpus;"6 but an alien seek-
ing admission has no right of due process and may be excluded without hearing."
Justice Minton disposed of the due process argument in a sentence: "Whatever
the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process so far as an alien denied
entry is concerned."' 8
There are five leading cases on the power of Congress to exclude, and all
demonstrate the harshness of a rule which gives to a suitor no substantive and
virtually no procedural rights. In The Chinese Exclusion Case,'" a resident of
the United States for 12 years was denied readmission though this denial violated
treaty rights and though the alien had been granted a valid re-entry certificate
upon his departure. In United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams,40 the exclusion
was upheld of an alien who held the political philosophy that absence of govern-
ment was preferable to its existence, and who was a philosophical, as opposed to
a practising, anarchist.4 In United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy,' the
Court in a 4-3 decision upheld the exclusion of the wife of a former member of
the U.S. armed forces seeking admission under the War Brides Act,4' without
a hearing, and with no facts stated as grounds for the allegation that her admis-
sion would be "prejudicial to the interests of the United States." 4  In Shaugh-
nessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei,4' petitioner had resided in the United States
for 25 years. He left to visit his dying mother in Romania and was refused re-
entry on the basis of confidential information from secret informers. Because no
this case, arguing that a person subject to deportation who is a lawful resident of the United
States is within the protection of the Constitution, and might not be deprived of liberty and
punished without due process of law, and in disregard of constitutional guarantees. 149 U.S. at
733. Justice Brewer criticized the doctrine of inherent sovereignty as being indefinite and
dangerous. He distinguished deportation from exclusion cases on the grounds that the
Constitution has no extraterritorial effect. 149 U.S. at 737-38. Justice Field also dissented. 149
U.S. at 744.
34 The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1903); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130
U.S. 581 '(1889).
35 United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904). Cf., Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972). In Turner the ratio decidendi of the case is not wholly clear,
and it has been argued that the case might as clearly stand for the proposition that an alien
does not have standing to demand admission on constitutional grounds. Comment, The Alien
and the Constitution, 20 U. CH. L. REv. 547, 548-49 (1953). In Mandel, the Court said that
it would not look behind a decision of the Attorney General made for a legitimate and bona-fide
reason or weigh it against the first amendment interests of those who would personally com-
municate with the alien. 408 U.S. at 770.
36 Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892).
37 United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950). The decision was
4 to 3.
38 Id. at 544.
39 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
40 194 U.S. 279 (1904).
41 194 U.S. at 292-294.
42 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
43 The War Brides Act, ch. 591, § 1-5, 59 Stat. 659 (1945).
44 338 U.S. at 539. Mrs. Knauff was detained by the immigration authorities for about
3 years before she was finally admitted following a reversal by the Board of Immigration Ap-
peals. M. KONVITZ, CiviL RIGHTS IN IMMIGRATION 49 (1953).
45 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
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other country would accept him, he was detained for over two years at Ellis
Island. The Court upheld the refusal to permit entry, on a 5-4 vote even if this
meant indefinite detention at Ellis Island. 8 In Kleindienst u. Mandel,47 a Bel-
gian Marxist theoretician and working journalist was excluded and prevented
from attending conferences and giving lectures at Stanford, Princeton, Amherst,
Columbia, Vassar, and before other groups on the discretion of the Attorney
General to admit or exclude aliens who advocate or have at any time advocated
the doctrines of world communism.4
The plenary power of Congress to exclude immigrants and other aliens is
based on an inherent power of sovereignty, on principles derived from inter-
national law.49 Most authorities on international law agree that states have the
power to exclude and expel aliens.5" This theory has been criticized, however,
as interfering with a fundamental right of international intercourse between
states." That the power to exclude may be one which is granted by international
law does not, in any case, resolve the question of the application of the Constitu-
tion to the exclusion of immigrants and other aliens. The language of the deci-
sions has indicated that this power is not to be found in the Constitution, but
resides solely in the legislative branch subject to delegation to the executive. It
is said not to be subject to judicial review. Logically, if the power is plenary,
Congress might use it to bar the entrance of aliens on grounds other than race
or national origin. For example, it might base exclusion on religious beliefs in
apparent violation of the first amendment. Because the federal government has
the power to exclude or admit, goes the argument, Congress may impose uncon-
stitutional conditions upon the immigrant and may adopt unconstitutional classi-
fications. This argument is the Holmesian argument that if the sovereign may
withhold a privilege from all, it may make any classification as to those receiving
the privilege.52 The argument runs: Congress may exclude immigrants, under
46 Justice Jackson in dissent argued that the petitioner was entitled at least to procedural,
due process:
Because the respondent has no right of entry, does it follow that he has no rights
at all? Does the power to exclude mean that exclusion may be continued or effectu-
ated by any means which happen to seem appropriate to the authorities? It would
effectuate his exclusion to eject him bodily into the sea or to set him adrift in a row-
boat. Would not such measures be condemned judicially as a deprivation of life
without due process of law? Suppose the authorities decide to disable an alien from
entry by confiscating his valuables and money. Would we not hold this a taking of
property without due process of law? Here we have a case that lies between the taking
of life and the taking of property: it is the taking of liberty. It seems to me that
this, occurring within the United States or its territorial waters, may be done only by
proceedings which meet the test of due process of law. 345 U.S. at 226-27.
47 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
48 One of his lectures was later given by transatlantic telephone. 408 U.S. at 759. Justices
Douglas, Marshall, and Brennan dissented.
49 The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889).
50 See e.g., I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 505 (1973); 1
OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAv 498-502 (3rd ed. 1920).
51 E. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD 45 (1915). A res-
olution of the Institute of International Law proposed this standard: "The free entrance of
aliens on the territory can only be prohibited in a general and permanent manner for reasons
of public interest and extremely grave motives, e.g., by reason of a fundamental difference of
morals or civilization, or by reason of an organization or dangerous accumulation of aliens who
appear en masse." Quoted in Id. at 45, n.2.
52 Comment, The Alien and the Constitution, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 547, 550 (1953). In
the case of McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, (1892),
Justice Holmes spoke for the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in denying the petition
[Vol. 49:1075] NOTES 1079
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international law, and probably also under the commerce clause. If Congress
has the power wholly to exclude, then the immigrant has no right of entry and
may only request the privilege of entry. Congress may grant the privilege on
whatever grounds it chooses, and the immigrant will have no basis for complaint.
In the Massachusetts case of Commonwealth v. Davis,53 Holmes upheld the con-
stitutionality of an ordinance which limited the use of Boston Commons for
public addresses:
For the legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in
a highway or public park is no more an infringement of the rights of a
member of the public than for the owner of a private house to forbid it in
his house. When no proprietary rights interfere, the legislature may end
the right of the public to enter upon the public place by putting an end to
the dedication to public uses. So it may take the less step of limiting the
public use to certain purposes.5 4
By the same argument, because the immigrant has no proprietary right of entry
(only a mere privilege), Congress may wholly end that right or impose any lesser
limitation on the granting of the right of entry. In Davis, a limitation on free
speech in a public park was upheld; in the immigration cases, exclusions based
on free speech, political or religious beliefs, race, or national origin could be
similarly upheld.
Later cases have recognized that the application of the Holmes theory to
the public sector could have devastating effects on private constitutional rights.5
Under this theory the state might impose the surrender of a constitutional right
as a condition for the granting of any privilege. The state might require a wel-
fare recipient to surrender his right to be free from unreasonable search and
seizure. 6 The state might use arbitrary or discriminatory classifications for the
granting of welfare or of public employment. With the expansion of govern-
mental activities and the growing importance of public employment, welfare,
unemployment and other government programs, the potential for abuse of con-
stitutional rights under this theory has been recognized. 7 The Holmes theory
has in consequence been struck down in several recent cases.58
of a policeman who had been fired for violating a regulation which restricted his political
activities: "The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no con-
stitutional right to be a policeman." Van Alstyne. The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinc-
tion in Constitutional Law, 81 HAv. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
53 162 Mass. 510,39 N.E. 113 (1895), aff'd, 167 U.S. 43 (1897) ; but see Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 536 (1965); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
54 162 Mass. at 511, 39 N.E. at 113.
55 See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law,
81 I-ALv. L. Rav. 1439, 1441-42 (1968).
56 But see Parrish v. Civil Service Conm'n, 66 Cal. 2d 260, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623, 425 P.2d
223 (1967) (county could not constitutionally condition the continued receipt of welfare bene-
fits on giving consent to warrantless searches). Cf., Wyman v. Jones, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
57 Van Alstyne, supra note 55.
58 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (held unconstitutional state discontinuance
of unemployment benefits to a person refusing Saturday employment for religious reasons);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (1 yr. residence requirement for state welfare
benefits held unconstitutional); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (procedural due
process held to require a hearing before termination of welfare benefits) ; Bell v. Burson, 402
U.S. 535 (1971) (due process held to require a hearing on possibility of fault before suspen-
sion of license of uninsured driver involved in an accident).
[June 1974]1080
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In Graham v. Richardson,59 the Court held that state statutes which deny
welfare benefits to resident aliens or to aliens who have not resided in the United
States for a specified number of years violated the equal protection clause. The
Court stated that "this Court now has rejected the concept that constitutional
rights turn upon whether a government benefit is characterized as a 'right' or as a
'privilege.' ,,1o The Court went on to find that the state's concern for fiscal integ-
rity was not a sufficiently compelling justification for the denial of welfare pay-
ments to aliens.61 The same principles apply to entry as to other government-
granted privileges. To permit unconstitutional conditions to be imposed on
immigrants could result in depriving resident aliens of various constitutional
rights and protections. The government might require immigrants to waive the
fourteenth amendment guarantees of equal protection and due process, or other
constitutional rights guaranteed to resident aliens." To permit the government
to impose unconstitutional conditions upon immigrants and other aliens seeking
to enter would permit indirect government limitations of rights of resident
aliens--rights which the government may not infringe directly. This argument
is especially forceful in light of the holding in Graham v. Richardson that alien-
age is a suspect classification whose use is subject to strict judicial scrutiny. The
decision there would seem to weaken fatally the argument that the power to
exclude is unfettered by any constitutional limitations. Entry into the United
States is a privilege, and an immigrant may not claim it as a right. Richardson,
however, holds that the distinction between a "right" and a "privilege" is not
determinative. It was said in Richardson that the state may not require an alien
to reside there for 15 years to qualify for welfare; similarly the federal govern-
ment should not be able to require that an immigrant have lived for 15 years
in a particular country to be eligible for admission. As the state may not refuse
unemployment benefits to a person refusing Saturday work on religious grounds,63
so the federal government should not be able to refuse admission to an immigrant
because of his religious beliefs. Abolition of the rights-privilege theory logically
carries with it the abolition of the theory that exclusion of immigrants and other
aliens is not subject to the test of constitutionality.
An important problem in applying constitutional standards to exclusion is
that of providing due process to immigrants and others seeking entry. The only
remedy which is available to the excluded alien is habeus corpus, which is avail-
able where the alien is in custody to test either (1) that the statutory procedure
had not been circumvented,"4 or (2) that the statutory procedure had been
administered fairly.65 For an immigrant or other alien who is denied a visa by
a consular officer, this remedy is unavailable even though the privilege of entry
be denied on unconstitutional grounds. The Administrative Procedure Act is
59 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
60 403 U.S. at 374.
61 403 U.S. at 375.
62 Infra at notes 108-10.
63 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 '(1963).
64 Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8 (1908); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142
U.S. 651, 659 (1892). Note, The Alien and the Constitution, 20 U. OHx. L. REv. 547, 551(1953).
65 Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454 (1920). Note, The Alien and the Constitution,
20 U. Gin. L. R-v. 547, 551 (1953).
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the standard of due process for other governmental administrative agencies which
apply to residents, e.g., to the granting of government employment, Social Secu-
rity, and other government benefits. It is submitted that this would also be the
proper standard of due process for reviewing administrative decisions to exclude,
absent some showing of a compelling reason to apply a different standard. 8
The proper constitutional test for restrictions on entry is the two-level test
applied to legislation generally. Where the restriction does not involve a suspect
classification or impinge on fundamental rights, a restriction on entry would have
to bear a reasonable relationship to a legitimate government interest.6 7 Present
immigration law contains various exclusion provisions which would need to
meet the test of a reasonable relationship to a legitimate state interest. We may
consider these as falling under the broad interests of public health and safety,
public morals, fiscal integrity, and national security, though these categories
overlap to a degree.
A. Public health and safety
Under present law, aliens who are afflicted with any dangerous contagious
disease are refused entry.68 This is the clearest example of exclusion to protect
public health and safety. Aliens may also be excluded who have noncontagious
diseases or physical defects;69 such exclusion is not based on preserving the public
health, but rather on grounds of preventing expenditure for treatment or for
support of an alien who might become a public charge. An argument might,
perhaps, be made on eugenic grounds that immigrants with hereditary defects,
e.g., hemophilia, color blindness, or Huntington's chorea, be excluded; but present
immigration law makes no provision for exclusion on this sort of eugenic grounds.
A major area of exclusion is of persons with mental defects or histories of
insanity. A person who is insane"0 or who has suffered one or more attacks of
insanity"' or who is afflicted with a psychopathic personality, sexual deviation, or
mental defect may not be admitted.72 Where there is evidence of criminal pathol-
ogy, exclusion on grounds of public safety would be proper. In other cases of
mental defects, the relationship to a government interest would have to be found
in prevention of public expense or treatment; or perhaps, where quotas are over-
subscribed, in the greater public contribution which could be made by an immi-
grant without such a defect. In the case of a physical defect, however, the alien
is excluded only if it would affect his capacity to earn a living and only if he
needs to work to earn a living. An alien with a mental defect is excluded regard-
less of his capacity or need to work. It would appear that where there is no
danger to public safety the same test should apply to mental defects as to phys-
66 But see Gordon, Due Process of Law in Immigration Proceedings, 50 A.B.A.J. 34 (1964).
67 E.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); Kotch v. Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552
'(1947). Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. Rav. 1065, 1077-87
(1969).
68 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6) (1970).
69 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (7) (1970).
70 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2) (1970).
71 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (3) (1970).
72 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (4) (1970).
[June 1974]
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ical ones. Other categories also cause difficulties. It has been held that a homo-
sexual is a "psychopathic personality"73 and excludable under the immigration
laws. It is at least questionable that there is any legitimate state interest in
excluding homosexuals who would otherwise qualify for entry.
Also ineligible for admission are aliens who are mentally retarded.' In
some cases this might be a proper basis for exclusion where the alien might be-
come a public charge. In other cases, however, the effect of this exclusion may
well be to force a family with a retarded member to choose between splitting the
family by immigrating or staying together in the foreign country. Where the
family as a whole would be a welcome addition to the United States, it is sub-
mitted that it is unreasonable to exclude it because of a trait such as mental re-
tardation which poses no hazard to society. In fact, this is recognized in the im-
migration law, which permits entry (subject to certain regulations) to a mentally
retarded alien who is the spouse, the unmarried son or daughter, or the parent
of a U.S. citizen or of any alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence or as
an immigrant.7 5 The effect of the exclusion rule, then, is that an immigrant with
a mentally retarded spouse, parent, or child cannot bring this person with him at
the time of his entry, but may later send for the person-a procedure which seems
unnecessarily cumbersome.
Also excludable on grounds of public safety are aliens who have been con-
victed of a crime (other than a purely political offense) involving moral turpi-
tude,'0 or two or more offenses of any kind,77 or of crimes relating to traffic in
narcotic drugs or marijuana." Exclusion on this ground would seem to be rea-
sonably related to the protection of public safety. " Difficulty arises, however,
with the provision that aliens are excludable:
[W]ho the consular officer or the Attorney General knows or -has reason to
believe seek to enter the United States solely, principally, or incidentally to
engage in activities which would be prejudicial to the public interest, or
endanger the welfare, safety, or security of the United States.80
This section would seem to permit virtually unfettered discretion to exclude
aliens otherwise admissible, without opportunity for hearing, on the basis solely
of a "reason to believe" that there is some threat to public safety, without even
73 Boutilier v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 363 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1967), aff'd,
387 U.S. 118 (1967).
74 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)'(1) (1970).
75 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (31) (g) (1970).
76 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a) (9) (1970).
77 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)'(10) (1970).
78 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a) (23) (1970).
79 It has been argued that the standard of "moral turpitude" is unconstitutionally vague.
In Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223 (1951), the Court upheld the constitutionality of that
standard, and held that distilling alcohol with intent to evade tax on the distilled spirits in-
volved moral turpitude. Justice Jackson, joined by Justices Black and Frankfurter, dissented:
So far as this offense is concerned with whiskey, it is not particularly un-American,
and we see no reason to strain to make the penalty for the same act so much more
severe in the case of an alien "bootlegger" than it is in the case of a native "moon-
shiner." I have never discovered that disregard of the Nation's liquor taxes excluded
a citizen from our best society and I see no reason why it should banish an alien from
our worst. 341 U.S. at 241.
80 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (27) (1970).
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the chance to prove, for example, mistaken identity. Although it is not clear
that this provision has been relied upon to exclude, it is submitted that such a
sweeping delegation of authority, in such broad terms, is unconstitutional for
vagueness.
B. Protection of public morals
Also excludable are certain classes of aliens who would seem to pose no
direct threat of harm to public health or safety, but who are excludable, it ap-
pears, on grounds of protecting public morals. These include prostitutes and
procurers; 8 polygamists or those who advocate polygamy;82 narcotic drug addicts
or chronic alcoholics;83 paupers, professional beggars, and vagrants;84 and those
coming to the United States to engage in any immoral sexual act.85 In general,
these would appear to be reasonable bases for exclusion since the classifications
involve behavior which would be criminal or because the alien would be likely
to become a public charge.
C. Fiscal integrity and economic welfare
Aliens are excludable who are likely to become public charges.86 Exclusion
to prevent entry of aliens who would likely increase public expenditure also,
no doubt, lies behind the exclusion of paupers, drug addicts, and alcoholics. The
1965 immigration act8 has extended this ground of exclusion to give preference
to immigrants who are members of the professions or who have exceptional
ability in the arts or sciences,' and to skilled and semi-skilled workers.? For
such workers and for others seeking entry to work, there must be a shortage of
employable and willing persons in the United States as certified by the Secretary
of Labor." Thus, to the requirement that one seeking entry must not be likely
to become a public charge is added the requirement that one seeking entry to
work must provide a needed skill or otherwise not take a job which might be
filled by a person already in the United States. Such a preference system is
clearly related to the national interest in promoting the economy9' although it
raises questions of the Brain Drain and of American relations with other coun-
tries.9 2
81 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(12) (1970).
82 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(11) (1970).
83 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5) (1970).
84 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(8) (1970).
85 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(13) (1970).
86 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (15) (1970).
87 Act of Oct. 3, 1965, 8 U.S.C. § 1151-55 (1970).
88 8 U.S.C. § 1153'(3) (1970).
89 8 U.S.C. § 1153(6) (1970).
90 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (14) (1970).
91 See Buckley v. Gibney, 332 F. Supp: 790 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 449 F.2d 1305 (2d
Cir. 1971).
92 See, e.g., Muir, Should the Brain Drain Be Encouraged? A Critical Look at the Grubel-
Scott Approach, 7 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION 34 (1969).
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D. National security
Various political activists and thinkers are excludable. These include anar-
chists; members of the Communist Party and those who have ever been members;
those who advocate doctrines of international communism; those who write,
publish, or distribute journals or printed matter which advocates the overthrow
of the government, assassination of public officials, sabotage, or the doctrines of
world communism; and other similar categories." An alien excludable under
this section may be admissible if he can establish that his membership or affiliation
was either involuntary; when he was under 16 years of age; by operation of
law; for purposes of obtaining food or other essentials of living; or that this
membership or affiliation had terminated at least 5 years prior to the date of
application, that he had since actively opposed the doctrines, etc., of the organ-
ization, and that his admission would be in the public interest.9 An alien may
also be excluded "with respect to whom the consular officer or the Attorney
General knows or has reasonable ground to believe" probably would engage in
subversive activities or join subversive organizations.95 National security is cer-
tainly a reasonable basis for exclusion. The difficulties with these provisions
arise from their conflict with first amendment rights of free speech, and from
the broad powers of discretionary exclusion they provide to consular officials,
especially when it is realized that it is virtually impossible to challenge the exercise
of this discretion in the courts. Where exclusion is used to prevent free speech
and the expression of political ideas, the exclusion conflicts with a fundamental
right and should be subject to the strict scrutiny test; that is, the exclusion should
be based upon a compelling state interest. As a practical matter, it is difficult
to perceive any real danger from the expression of radical or subversive ideas by
aliens, dangers which could not be obviated by other means; e.g., limitations of
time, posting of bond, etc., and would require their exclusion. In Sugarman v.
DougallP the Court indicated that a compelling interest to define the political
community permitted the restriction of aliens from the exercise of the political
rights of citizens. This argument could be applied to restrict the political activity
of aliens seeking entry (e.g., raising funds, lobbying, participating in political
campaigns and demonstrations) while protecting rights of free speech and press.
Under the present statute an alien might be excluded for acts done outside the
United States which would be protected by the first amendment within the
United States.97 Properly, such activity might be received as evidence that an
alien seeking admission would damage national security, and the alien could be
required to prove his constitutional entitlement to entry. A law which bans entry
solely because of political opinion, however, imposes an unconstitutional condi-
93 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (28) (1970).
94 Id.
95 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (29) (1970).
96 93 S. Ct. 2842, 2850-51 (1973).
97 Mere advocacy of doctrine is protected by the first amendment and none of the pro-
visions in the immigration law require that any advocacy must incite to illegal action, or require
more than mere membership in a subversive organization be proved. See Keyishian v. Board
of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 589-600 '(1967) ; Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 312 (1957);
Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Naturalization Power, 80 YAM.z L.J. 769, 787 (1971).
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tion on the privilege of entry and, under Graham and other cases, should be
unconstitutional.
In Kleindienst v. Mandel,98 the Court was presented with this issue in the
case of a Belgian Marxist author and editor whose request for entry to address
college audiences and participate in other events was denied under the discretion
of the Attorney General. The opinion of the Court, however, does little to resolve
the issues involved. It does not consider the standing to sue of the alien, and it
specifically does not consider the plenary power doctrine.9 The Court holds that
if legislative authority is properly delegated and if the Attorney General gives
"a facially legitimate and bona fide reason [for the exclusion]P°° the courts will
neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its
justification against the First Amendment interests of those who seek personal
communication with the applicant."'0 1 The Court declined to address the issue
of whether the first amendment or other grounds might be available where no
justification for exclusion was given. The Mandel case upheld the exclusion of
an alien on very narrow grounds where the basis of the exclusion was clearly the
political opinions of the alien. However, the language of the case indicates a
retreat from the broad statement of the plenary power doctrine and suggests that
future cases might establish the principle that this power is subject to constitu-
tional limitations.
It was suggested above that the right of free speech is a fundamental right
and that restrictions of entry for the purpose of restricting free speech, to be up-
held, should be based upon a compelling governmental interest. The compelling
governmental interest test for constitutionality applies to legislation which either
infringes on fundamental rights or which employs suspect criteria; e.g., race,
religion, or national origin."0 2 The government has the burden of proving that
such legislation is based upon a compelling interest in order to sustain constitu-
tionality.
Restrictions on immigration have frequently discriminated on grounds of
race and national origins. Chinese were wholly excluded and other Asians had
very small quotas. Under the quota system instituted in the 1920's, northern and
western Europeans were highly favored, while all others were, in effect, largely
excluded.' These provisions were abolished in 1965 by an act which provided,
with certain exceptions, that:
No person shall receive any preference or priority or be discriminated
against in the issuance of an immigrant visa because of his race, sex, nation-
ality, place of birth, or place of residence .... 104
98 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
99 408 U.S. at 767.
100 The reason upon which the court found exclusion could be based was that on an earlier
visit Mandel might have exceeded the limitations on his visa. 408 U.S. at 758, n.5. This
point was not relied on by the government, however, which conceded that Mandel might not
have been notified of the limitations. 408 U.S. at 769.
101 408 U.S. at 770.
102 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); 'McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964);
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
103 M. KONVITZ, supra note 19.
104 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a) (1970).
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The exceptions relate to family relationships with United States residents, special
provisions for refugees, and special provisions for aliens from Western Hemisphere
countries. For other immigrants, each country is limited to 20,000 visas a year" 5
within an Eastern Hemisphere total of 170,000.106 The effect of this change
in the law has been a large increase in the number of immigrants from Asia and
from countries such as Greece and Italy which previously had oversubscribed
quotas." It might be argued that the 20,000 limit for visas per year per country
is in effect discrimination on the basis of national origin, but because the purpose
of the law is to encourage diversity and because it is not aimed at any particular
national groups, this classificatory scheme would appear to be proper.
II. Rights of Resident Aliens
Immigrants and other aliens resident in the United States are subject to the
law of the United States.' They are "persons" under the fourteenth amend-
ment' 9 and the Civil Rights Act of 1870." Nonetheless, legal restrictions of
resident aliens have been permitted in certain areas, notably on the right to own
land,""' the right to public employment," and the right to engage in various
professions and occupations." 3 These restrictions have been almost entirely in-
validated by the holding in Graham v. Richardson"4 that classifications on the
basis of alienage are inherently suspect and by the application of this equal pro-
tection standard to public employment in Sugarman v. Dougall"5 and to state
restrictions on engaging in the professions in In re Griffiths."' The major areas
in which the rights of aliens now differ from those of citizens are the areas of
political rights (e.g, to vote, to hold elective and high public office, and to serve
on a jury) and of rights with respect to deportation.
The Supreme Court in Yick Wo v. Hopkins'17 held that a resident alien is
a person entitled to the protection of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. In Wong Wing v. United States,"8 aliens were held to be protected
by the fifth and sixth amendments and to be entitled to due process and trial by
jury. There are few cases on the civil rights of resident aliens, and these cases
105 Id.
106 8 U.S.C. § 1151(a) '(1970).
107 Keely, Effects of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 on Selected Population
Characteristics of Immigrants to the United States, 8 DEMOGRAPHY 157 (1971).
108 Carlisle v. United States, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 147, 154 (1872).
109 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118, U.S. 356 (1886).
110 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 (1970). Roberto v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.. 177 F.2d 811 (7th Cir.
1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 920 (1950). See also Takahashi v. Fish And Game Comm'n,
334 U.S. 410 (1948).
111 Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923) ; Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923);
Webb v. O'Brien, 263 U.S. 313 (1923); Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326 (1923); but see Oyama
v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
112 Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915); Rok v. Legg, 27 F. Supp. 243 (D.C. Cal.
1939); but see Sugarman v. Dougall, 93 S. Ct. 2842 (1973).
113 See, e.g., Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckenbach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927) '(operating a pool
room). But see In re Griffiths, 93 S. Ct. 2861 (1973).
114 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971).
115 93 S. Ct. 2842 (1973).
116 93 S. Ct. 2861 (1973).
117 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
118 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
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tend to take it for granted that an alien resident in this country is protected by
the Bill of Rights.119
Most of the litigation on the rights of resident aliens has been on the appli-
cation of the equal protection clause to aliens. In Yick Wa, a San Francisco
ordinance requiring a license to operate a laundry in a wooden building was
struck down as being in fact a discriminatory measure against resident Chinese 2 0
and designed to restrict the private employment of aliens in a particular occu-
pation. In 1915, in Truax v. Raich,"2 the Supreme Court struck down a state
statute limiting private employment of aliens. The Arizona statute, which pro-
vided that when anyone employed five or more persons not less than eighty per-
cent had to be citizens, was held to violate equal protection. 2 "It requires no
argument," the Court said, "to show that the right to work for a living in the
common occupations of the community is of the very essence of the personal
freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the Amendment to secure."' 5
The Court noted that the act was not limited to persons engaged in public
work," 4 and found no sufficient public interest involved which would support
the classification on grounds of alienage.125 Further, the act in effect was con-
sidered to infringe on the federal power to control inmigration.2 6
In two cases decided later the same year, the Court found a basis for classi-
fication on grounds of alienage where a New York law prohibited state employ-
ment of alien laborers." The state as employer was considered to be in the same
position as a private employer. No one has an absolute right to work for the
state, the Court reasoned, and therefore the state, equally with private employers,
was held to be unrestricted by the fourteenth amendment in the area of public
employment.
2 8
State restrictions on employment of aliens have also been upheld under the
state's police power. One basis for the state to forbid licensing of aliens has
been where the occupation is of a dangerous or anti-social nature. This rationale
has been used to forbid resident aliens from operating a pool room,' from
selling intoxicating liquors, 3 ' from hawking and peddling,' and from acting as
119 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945) ("Freedom of speech and of press is
accorded aliens residing in this country.") (dictum); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252
(1941) ; Comment, The Alien and the Constitution, 20 U. OHS. L. REv. 547, 565 (1953).
120 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
121 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
122 239 U.S. at 43.
123 239 U.S. at 41.
124 239 U.S. at 40.
125 239 U.S. at 43.
126 239 U.S. at 42.
127 Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915); Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915).
128 Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175. 192 (1915).
129 Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927).
130 'Tokaji v. State Bd. of Equalization, 20 Cal. App. 2d 612, 67 P.2d 1082 .(1937); Tragesor
v. Gray, 73 Md. 250, 20 A. 905 '(1890); Bloomfield v. State, 86 Ohio St. 253, 99 N.E. 309
(1912); contra, In re Naka's License, 9 Alas. I (D. Alas. 1934).
131 Commonwealth v. Hana, 195 Mass. 262, 81 N.E. 149 (1907) (dictum); State v. Mont-
gomery, 94 Me. 192, 47 A. 165 (1900); accord, Sayre Borough v. Phillips, 148 Pa. 142, 24 A.
76 (1892).
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pawnbrokers. 132 The logic of these cases is highly dubious,' especially because
it is difficult to see a connection between the fact of alienage and the threat to
public health and safety from these occupations. Cases under the state's police
power involve occupations and activities which the state might regulate or wholly
prohibit because of their dangerous or antisocial nature. State restrictions have
also been imposed on professions subject to state licensing. Resident aliens have
been barred in various states from the professions of medicine, law, pharmacy,
accounting, and teaching, and from such various occupations as breeding domes-
tic fish, giving manicures, shoeing horses, and promoting wrestling. 4
The constitutionality of many of these statutory restrictions was called into
question by the Supreme Court in Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission,"'
which involved a California statute prohibiting the issuance of licenses to fish
in California waters (and, to effectuate the statutory purpose, from bringing
caught fish to California for sale) to aliens not eligible for citizenship. The
statute applied primarily to Japanese, who at that time were ineligible for citi-
zenship. The Court found no "special public interest" which would support the
California ban and stated that "the power of a state to apply its laws exclusively
to its alien inhabitants as a class is confined within narrow limits."'1 6 This lan-
guage in Takahashi was expanded by Graham v. Richardson,3 7 which herd
that alienage was a suspect classification and subject to close judicial scrutiny.as
In Sugarman v. Dougall,'3 9 this test was applied to strike down a New York
statute restricting employment in the classified civil service to citizens; the Court
found no substantial public interest involved in such classification. 4" Further,
the Court argued that restrictions on public employment of aliens must be pre-
cisely defined and within narrow limits. 41 The effect of the case appears to be
that a state may bar aliens only from elective office and from other high public
offices. One important question specifically left unanswered in Sugarman is the
extent to which the federal government may exclude aliens from federal employ-
ment. Unless the Court finds that there is some compelling interest involved in
the exclusion of aliens, it would seem that flat federal bans on the employment of
aliens also violate equal protection. 4
2
132 Asakura v. Seattle, 122 Wash. 81, 210 P. 30 (1922), rev'd, 265 U.S. 332 (1924)(alien's right to engage in trade guaranteed by treaty with Japan).
133 See, e.g., Note, Constitutionality of Restrictions on Aliens' Right to Work, 57 COLUm.
L. REv. 1012, 1022-24 '(1957).
134 M. KoNVrTZ The Alien and the Asiatic in American Law 190-207 (1946); Comment,
Constitutionality of Restrictions on Aliens' Right to Work, 57 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1012, 1012-13
(1957).
135 -3-94 U.S. 410 (1948).
136 334 U.S. at 420.
137 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
138 403 US. at 372.
139 93 S. Ct. 2842 (1973).
140 93 S. Ct. at 2848-49.
141 93 S. Ct. at 2847-48.
142 In a case decided before Sugarman bans on alien employment in the federal civil service
were upheld. Mow Son Wong v. Hampton, 333 F. Supp. 527 (N.D. Cal. 1971). In Jalil v.
Hampton, 460 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972), the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia remanded for reconsideration of factual matters relating
to the federal civil service ban on employment of aliens. Judge Bazelon dissented and argued
that such a restriction was unconstitutional under Graham. The Supreme Court denied cer-
tiorari, but it may well be that this case will settle the matter after rehearing.
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On the same day that Sugarman was decided, the Court also invalidated a
state bar rule prohibiting the practice of law by resident aliens. In In re
Griffiths'. the Court held that the profession of law does not "place one so close
to the core of the political process as to make [one] a formulator of goverhlment
policy,"144 and that there was in consequence not a substantial enough state
interest to justify the restriction of the bar to citizens.'45 The Connecticut bar
rule was held to infringe equal protection. The fact that the Supreme Court
struck down a rule restricting admission to the bar to citizens is especially signifi-
cant because law is the profession most closely related to state government itself
and is the profession most widely barred to resident aliens."' The Court's holding
that this restriction is unconstitutional and its criticism of Ohio ex rel. Clarke v.
Deckenbach47 indicate that almost the entire range of state restrictions on alien
employment violates equal protection. Private employers may still require that
employees be citizens,'" but the effect of the decisions in Takahashi, Graham,
Sugarman, and Griffiths is to eliminate virtually all state classifications based on
alienage in regard to state employment, licensed occupations, and professions,
with the exception of elective and high public offices. Since alienage is now con-
sidered to be an inherently suspect classification, the state would have the burden
of establishing the reasonableness of any such classification; and it is difficult to
imagine a private occupation in which a classification based on alienage per se
would be reasonable. The state may properly require competence and knowledge
of American law and society in professions such as law,1 "9 but it may no longer
impose flat bans on alien employment.
The need for the extension of judicial protection of the civil rights of resident
aliens is most clear with respect to employment. The arbitrary and almost
whimsical state restrictions on alien employment derive largely from the fact that
aliens lack the political right to vote and the protection this might give in the
political arena. Aliens pay taxes and are subject to all other laws. To permit the
widespread restrictions on employment in the professions was to assign aliens to
a permanently inferior social and economic position. It is true, of course, that
alienage is not necessarily a permanent condition and that in almost all cases the
resident alien might be naturalized and granted the political rights of a citizen.
It seems proper, however, that the civil rights of aliens be commensurate with
their civil responsibilities. 50
Another important restriction on aliens has been on their right to own
143 93 S. Ct. 2851 '(1973).
144 93 S. Ct. at 2858.
145 The Court did not consider the case of rules permitting the membership in the bar
to resident aliens who had made a declaration of intention to become a citizen, but not to
other resident aliens. The broad language of the decision would indicate that this limitation
would also violate equal protection.
146 M. KONvrrz, THE ALIEN AND THE AsIATIc IN AMERICAN LAW 190-207 (1946).
147 274 U.S. 392 (1927).
148 Espinoza v. Farah Mg. Co., Inc., 42 U.S.L.W. 4014 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1973).
149 In re Griffths. 93 S. Ct. 2851, 2857 (1973).
150 justice Rehnquist dissented in Sugarman and '(joined by Chief Justice Burger) in
Grifliths. He argued that alienage was unlike classifications such as race, national origins, and
illegitimacy, in that alienage is generally not a permanent class-the alien through naturalization
can obtain the rights of a citizen. By declaring alienage a "suspect classification," he argued,
the Court failed to recognize basic differences between aliens and citizens and went beyond
the intent of the fourteenth amendment. 93 S. Ct. at 2861.
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property. Several Western states passed statutes aimed at preventing Chinese and
Japanese from owning farm land; these were upheld by the Supreme Court in
a series of cases in the 1920's.' The basis of these cases was weakened by Oyama
v. California,' which held unconstitutional a part of the California Alien Land
Law. The constitutionality of the restrictions on alien ownership was not decided,
but four Justices in concurring opinions would have held the law unconstitutional
on this ground. Subsequent state court cases relied on Oyama to find alien land
statutes unconstitutional on grounds of equal protection. 53 It is most unlikely that
any general statute forbidding ownership of land by resident aliens would now be
upheld.
III. Deportation
An immigrant or other resident alien is protected by the Constitution much
as is a citizen. He is a "person" and is entitled to rights under the fourteenth
amendment,"5 4 and to the protection of the fifth and sixth amendments guar-
anteeing jury trial and due process. 5 The protections provided by these funda-
mental rights do not extend to proceedings to deport, however. Because deporta-
tion has been held to be a civil penalty rather than a criminal one, a resident alien
may be detained without bail;' may be examined in an administrative hearing
without a jury and before a hearing officer who acts as judge and prosecutor;'
and may be deported no matter how long he may have been a tTS. resident
though he has been charged with no criminal act.'58 He may be deported for hav-
ing performed some act which is constitutionally protected.'5 9 The language of
the courts indicates that he may be deported without reason under the plenary
power of Congress.'
The theory that Congress has plenary power to deport as well as to exclude
was first set out in Fong Yue Ting v. United States. 6' The Chinese Exclusion
Act of 18921' required all Chinese laborers resident in the United States at the
time of the act to apply for a certificate of residence within one year. After that
time, any Chinese laborer without a certificate was to be deported unless he
could prove unavoidable reasons which prevented his applying and unless he had
the testimony of one white witness that he was legally resident at the time of the
act. Chinese witnesses were considered not to be credible. The Court upheld the
151 See note 69 supra.
152 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
153 State v. Oakland, 129 Mont. 347, 287 P.2d 39 (1955); Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d
718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952); Kenji Namba v. McCourty 185 Ore. 579, 204 P.2d 569 (1949).
154 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
155 Wong Wing v. United States. 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
156 Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
157 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b) (1970). Dicta in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33(1950) indicated that this might be constitutionally objectionable. See the discussion in Note,
Deportation and Exclusion: A Continuing Dialogue between Congress and the Courts, 71
YALP L.J. 760 (1962).
158 E.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
159 Id. Galvan was ordered deported for being a member of the Communist Party at a
time when it was a legal political party.
160 E.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580(1952) ; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
161 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
162 Act of May 5, 1892, ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25.
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act and deportation orders under it as well as arrest without warrant and deten-
tion without bail incident to deportation. Dicta in the case indicated that depor-
tation might be effected without trial or examination.'
The Court relied on The Chinese Exclwsion Case"4 and various authorities
on international law in support of the doctrine that Congress has plenary power
to exclude and deport. Resident aliens, the Court said, "remain subject to the
power of Congress to expel them, or to order them to be removed and deported
from the country, whenever in its judgment their removal is necessary or ex-
pedient for the public interest."'"" Further, the Court held that the deportee did
not have the procedural rights incident to a criminal proceeding and was not en-
titled to a trial:
The order of deportation is not a punishment for crime. It is not a banish-
ment, in the sense in which that word is often applied to the expulsion of a
citizen from his country by way of punishment. It is but a method of en-
forcing the return to his own country of an alien who has not complied with
the conditions upon the performance of which the government of the nation,
acting within its constitutional authority and through the proper depart-
ments, has determined that his continuing to reside here shall depend. He
has not, therefore, been deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law; and the provisions of the Constitution, securing the right of
trial by jury, and prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, and cruel
and unusual punishments, have no application.1 6
That a person legally resident in the United States could be deprived of
such fundamental rights in a determination of whether he was to be expelled from
the country was an extraordinary statement. In his dissent, Justice Brewer at-
tacked the theory that the right to expel was an inherent power, and argued that,
as the United States is a nation of delegated powers, any "inherent" power must
be reserved under the tenth amendment to the states or to the people. The Con-
stitution gave the government no general power to banish. "Banishment may be
resorted to as punishment for crime; but among the powers reserved to the people
and not delegated to the government is that of determining whether whole classes
in our midst shall, for no crime but that of their race and birthplace, be driven
from our territory."'' Justice Brewer and the other two dissenters also attacked
the theory that deportation was not punishment. Deportation may deprive a
person of livelihood, liberty, or property. It involves forcible arrest and removal
from family and from business. Justice Brewer quoted Madison: "If a banish-
ment of this sort be not punishment, and among the severest of punishments, it
will be difficult to imagine a doom to which the name can be applied.' 0 8
In later deportation cases, the Court has followed the majority in Fong Yue
Ting and held that deportation is a civil rather than a criminal penalty. For this
reason, constitutional rights incident to criminal proceedings have been held not
to apply. The Court has said that an alien has no right to protest unreasonable
163 149 U.S. at 728.
164 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
165 149 U.S. at 724.
166 149 U.S. at 730.
167 149 U.S. at 737-38.
168 149 U.S. at 741.
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searches and -seizures incident to deportation,0 9 and that he may not obtain
judicial review unless the proceedings are shown to have been manifestly unfair.'°
He may even be deported under an ex post facto law.
171
The civil theory of deportation was reaffirned in Harisiades v. Shaugh-
nessf'7 and in Galuan v. Press.' In the latter case, Justice Frankfurter, in
delivering the opinion of the Court, noted that the consequences of deportation
are close to those of punishment, and that "much could be said for the view, were
we writing on a clean slate, that the Due Process Clause qualifies the scope of
political discretion heretofore recognized as belonging to Congress in regulating
the entry and deportation of aliens." '74 But, said Justice Frankfurter, the slate
was not clean.
Majority opinions of the Court have recognized the severity of deportation,
especially for long-time alien residents,7 " while a series of dissenting opinions have
attacked the civil character of deportation proceedings and the plenary power of
Congress to deport 6 These opinions derive special force from the facts of the
cases involved. In Galvan v. Press a native Mexican who had lived in the
United States for 36 years, from the age of 7, was ordered deported. He had
joined the Communist Party in 1944 and was a member for two or three years.
At that time, the Party was a legal political organization with candidates on the
California ballot. Nevertheless, Galvan was held to be deportable under the
Internal Security Act of 1950 which provided for the deportation of any alien
who had been a member of the Communist Party at the time of entry or at any
time thereafter. As Justice Black said in dissent, "For joining a lawful political
group years ago--an act which he had no possible reason to believe would sub-
ject him to the slightest penalty-petitioner now loses his job, his friends, his
home, and maybe even his children, who must choose between their father and
their native country."'"" In Carlson v. Landon'79 the Court upheld the dis-
169 Li Sing v. United States, 180 U.S. 486 (1901).
170 Low Woh Suey v. Backus, 225 U.S. 460 "(1912).
171 Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
172 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
173 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
174 347 U.S. at 530-31.
175 "It visits a great hardship on the individual and deprives him of the right to stay and
live and work in this land of freedom." Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945); "It
may result also in loss of both property and life; or of all that makes life worth living." Ng
Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922); "(D)eportation is a drastic measure and at
times the equivalent of banishment or exile." Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948).
176 Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 532 (1954) '(Black & Douglas, JJ., dissenting); Hari-
siades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 598 '(1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Carlson v. Landon,
342 U.S. 524, 547 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting); Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 232
(1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting); Knauer v. U.S., 328 U.S. 654, 675 (1946) (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 157 (1945) (Murphy, J., concurring); Fong Yue
Ting, v. U.S., 149 U.S. 698, 732 (1893) '(Brewer & Field, JJ., and Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
177 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
178 347 U.S. at 533. Justice Douglas also dissented, arguing:
Aliens who live here in peace, who do not abuse our hospitality, who are law-abiding
members of our communities, have the right to due process of law. They, too, are
"persons" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. They can be molested by the
Government in times of peace only when their presence here is hostile to the safety
or welfare of the Nation. If they are to be deported, it must be for what they are
and do, not for what they once believed.
347 U.S. at 534.
179 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
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cretionary refusal of the Attorney General to grant bail to aliens detained during
proceedings for deportation though there was no claim that the resident aliens
might leave the jurisdiction where they had homes, jobs, and families.' That
case also involved alien members of the Communist Party. Justice Black dis-
sented:
Today the Court holds that law-abiding persons, neither charged with nor
convicted of any crime, can be held in jail indefinitely, without bail, if a
subordinate Washington bureau agent believes they are members of the
Communist Party, and therefore dangerous to the Nation because of the
possibility of their "indoctrination of others."
181
The extent to which the deportee may be deprived of constitutional rights
can be seen in Abel u. United States.'82 Petitioner was arrested for deportation
upon an administrative warrant without authorization by an independent mag-
istrate. His premises, books, and papers were searched incident to the arrest
without search warrant and the evidence found was used in later criminal pro-
ceedings. He was not taken before any independent officer, but was taken to
local administrative headquarters, then flown to a special detention camp. He
was held without bail and interrogated for over five weeks; and while still under
detention, he was served with a bench warrant on criminal charges upon an in-
dictment.' All of this was upheld because the proceeding was one in deporta-
tion and the deportee was not entitled to the same procedural rights as one ar-
rested on a "criminal charge."
The Court has used two basic arguments in upholding the narrow limits of
due process in proceedings to deport. First, it has argued that the power to
expel, as the power to exclude, is a plenary power deriving from the nature of
sovereignty. Carried to its logical conclusion, this argument would support mass
exile, without hearing or cause, of aliens long resident in the United States. It
would support political or religious persecution of resident aliens. For example,
the government might expel Jewish or Catholic aliens under this logic; a
Democratic administration might expel aliens it believed favored the Republicans,
or vice versa. The theory of plenary power would suport such action.
The Court has set certain limits to the plenary power, however. Where a
criminal penalty is imposed along with deportation, the Court has held that the
fifth and sixth amendments do apply."8 The Court has also indicated that de-
portation would not be upheld without a fair hearing.' These decisions indicate
that there is some limit to the sovereign power to deport, at least procedurally.
180 The Court in that case dismissed the argument that the denial of bail violated the
Eighth Amendment with little argument, noting only that in certain cases (murder and cases
on appeal which prevent no substantial question), bail might be denied. The Court presented
no reason why detention awaiting what it considered to be a civil proceeding, deportation,
should not be bailable. 342 U.S. at 545-46.
181 342 U.S. at 547-48.
182 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
183 362 U.S. at 251. This case involved the Soviet agent Rudolph Abel. As Justice Douglas
said in dissent, "Cases of notorious criminals-like cases of small, miserable ones-are apt
to make bad law." 362 U.S. at 241.
184 Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
185 Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223 (1951); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945).
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The second basic argument of the Court has been that deportation is not a
punishment. This argument in part derives from the sovereign power argument
-if an alien may be deported for any reason deemed expedient, then his ex-
plusion is not a criminal punishment for some misdeed. Of course, if the power
is truly sovereign, it seems unnecessary to argue whether the penalty is civil or
criminal; the classification becomes merely a means of holding that procedural
rights do not apply to deportation, without facing the general issue of whether
the government may perform such "sovereign" acts in ways repugnant to the
Constitution.
The Court's criticism of the theory that deportation is not punishment was
noted above."' 6 For an alien legally resident in the U.S., one cannot imagine
how deportation can be considered anything less than punishment. The alien
is deprived of a right granted to him upon entry-the right to reside in this
country. The manner of this deprivation is through banishment, which has been
recognized as a punishment by the courts when applied to citizens."' 7 It is
certainly felt as punishment by the alien who loses residence, livelihood, perhaps
liberty and property, and much else-and this is felt more deeply, perhaps, where
it is imposed for having broken no law. As Justice Brandeis said, "To deport...
may result in loss of both property and life; or of all that makes life worth
living."' To hold that a person might be subjected to such a penalty, yet to
hold it to be "civil" is wholly unjust."9
The courts have recognized the severity of deportation for a resident alien,
yet they have as yet been unwilling to extend constitutional protection to cases
of deportation. Upon the basis of recent decisions this approach is no longer ten-
able. The Court held in Graham v. Richardson that alienage is a suspect criterion
under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and the federal
government has at least as strict a duty with regard to equal protection as do the
states. 9 Yet deportation is a penalty applied only to resident aliens and would
be considered punishment for citizens; in fact, it is probably barred as cruel and
unusual punishment when applied to a citizen. 9' If equal protection is to have
any meaning for a resident alien, surely it must mean that he cannot be deprived
186 See generally, Navasky, Deportation as Punishment, 27 U. KAN. CiTy L. Rav. 213
(1959).
187 See, e.g., State v. Doughie, 237 N.C. 368, 74 S.E. 2d 922 (1953); Ex Parte Scar-
borough, 76 Cal. App. 2d 648. 173 P.2d 825 (1946).
188 Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1921).
189 Justice Jackson in his dissenting opinion in Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 243(1951) : A resident alien is entitled to due process of law. We have said that deportation is
equivalent to banishment or exile. Deportation proceedings technically are not crimi-
nal; but practically they are for they extend the criminal process of sentencing to
include on the same conviction an additional punishment of deportation. If respon-
dent were a citizen, his aggregate sentences of three years and a day would have
been served long since and his punishment ended. But because of his alienage, he
is about to begin a life sentence of exile from what has become home, of separation
from his established means of livelihood for himself and his family of American citi-
zens. This is a savage penalty and we believe due process of law requires standards
for imposing it as definite and certain as those for conviction of crime.
190 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
191 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (denaturalization used as punishment held to be
cruel and unusual). See Armstrong, Banishment: Cruel and Unusual Punishment, Ill U. PA.
L. REv. 758 (1963).
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of his right of residence, removed from home and livelihood, and expelled without
criminal charge or proceedings. The state may not bar aliens from welfare
benefits, from state employment, or from becoming members of the professions;
yet if the plenary power doctrine is followed, the federal government might ac-
complish all of these ends through deportation. Application of the equal protec-
tion doctrine to legally resident aliens requires that they not be subjected to the
penalty of deportation without the application, at a minimum, of those standards
of due process which would be applied in a criminal trial to impose a severe
penalty on a citizen. Further, because the Court has recognized that alienage is
a suspect criterion, the application of the penalty of deportation, a penalty which
applies only to aliens, should be upheld only upon the showing of a compelling
state interest.
In outlining the constitutional standards which should be applied to pro-
ceedings to deport, it is important to distinguish between legally admitted resident
aliens and those who entered illegally. Aliens who have entered illegally should
not by entrance alone have acquired any right to residence. Logically, their rights
should be of no higher order than those of a non-resident seeking admission.
Illegal resident aliens are a serious problem, numbering, it is estimated, between
one and two million persons.' 9' Entry and residence in the United States are
privileges which may be granted or refused, and deportation of illegal resident
aliens is clearly proper and necessary as incident to the prevention of illegal entry.
Indeed, it has been argued that the plenary power doctrine as set out by the
Court in the early cases on deportation applied only to illegal aliens.'
9
1
Deportation of a legally resident alien takes from him valuable rights. If
equal protection for aliens is to have any meaning, this deprivation should be
imposed only for serious offenses and upon a compelling state interest. The
grounds for deportation under present law are far broader than this. One com-
missioner of immigration has estimated that there are 700 different grounds for
deportation.' These may be divided into four broad groups: 95
(i) Those aliens who entered the United States without inspection;
or, having been admitted for a temporary stay, remained longer than
permitted or otherwise violated the conditions of their stay.'96
(ii) Those aliens who were excludable at entry but nevertheless
were permitted to enter the country.197
(iii) Those aliens who within five years of entry committed an act
or assumed a condition that rendered them deportable. Among such
acts or conditions are: (1) conviction of a crime involving moral tur-
pitude with a prison sentence for a term of one year or more;' 98 (2)
192 Dietz, Deportation in the United States, Great Britain and International Law, 7 INTER-
NATIONAL LAWYER 326, 330 (1973).
193 Hesse, The Constitutional Status of the Lawfully Admitted Permanent Resident Alien:
The Pre-1917 Cases, 68 YALE L.J. 1578 (1959).
194 Maslow, Recasting Our Deportation Law: Proposals for Reform, 56 COLUM. L. REv.
309, 314 (1956).
195 Id. at 315.
196 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a) (2), (9), (10) (1970).
197 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)'(1) (1970).
198 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (4) (1970).
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being institutionalized at public expense because of a mental disease
existing prior to entry; (3) becoming a public charge from causes not
arising after entry; (4) conviction of attempting to cause insubordina-
tion or disloyalty in the Armed Forces of the United States; (5) assisting
another alien for gain in an attempt to enter the United States illegally.199
(iv) Those aliens who at any time after entry: (1) are convicted
of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude;"' (2) wilfully fail to
comply with the registration requirements of the Alien Registration
Act;2"1 (3) become members of, or "affiliated with," the Communist
Party of the United States or any other totalitarian party;202 (4) become
drug addicts or violate the narcotics acts;20 3 (5) are connected with a
house of prostitution or import aliens for immoral purposes;... (6) are
convicted of illegal possession of any automatic guns; 0. (7) are con-
victed of a violation of the espionage, sabotage, selective service, or
trading-with-the-enemy acts and, in addition, are found to be un-
desirable residents. 08
The first category causes few problems constitutionally. Those entering
illegally should be subject to deportation, and those granted entry only for a
temporary stay may properly be ordered to leave upon the termination of the
granted period. Difficulty does arise with provisions for deportation for violation
of the conditions of stay. It should be recognized that deportation can be a
severe penalty and is not to be imposed for technical violations by legally ad-
mitted, permanently resident aliens and immigrants.
The second category includes aliens who were excludable at the time of
entry but were nonetheless permitted entry. This category raises serious problems.
It contains no statute of limitations so that an alien who was admitted though
excludable on grounds of mental or physical defect, for example, might be
deported even after many years of residence. This also applies to those who were
permitted entry without proper travel documents. A defect in such a document,
even though unknowing or unintentional, would render a resident alien deport-
able many years later. In such cases deportation should be limited to fraud to
obtain entry or some other attempt to evade the procedures for obtaining entry.
The third category, in effect, provides for a five year probation period
during which an alien may be expelled. Deportable offenses include crimes in-
volving moral turpitude, attempting to cause disloyalty in the Anned Forces, and
assisting the illegal entry of an alien for gain. As conditions imposed on the rights
of residence these provisions are reasonable, especially because they involve con-
viction of criminal offenses and because there is a limitation to the period of five
199 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(3), (8), (13), (15) '(1970).
200 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (4) (1970).
201 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)'(5) (1970).
202 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a) (6) (1970).
203 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(11) (1970).
204 8 U.S.-C. §§ 1251(a)(12), '(18) (1970).
205 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (14-) (1970).
206 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(17) (1970).
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years after entry.2"7 The provisions that one who is institutionalized at public ex-
pense because of a mental defect or who becomes a public charge within five
years after entry be deportable is cruel and constitutionally questionable, however.
Under Graham v. Richardson a resident alien might not be denied welfare
benefits or be subject to a residence period, yet this provision renders an alien who
applies for such benefits deportable if the application is within five years of entry.
It sets up a federal residence period though a state period has been held violative
of equal protection. It places on the alien the burden of proving that the cause
for his seeking public assistance or his mental disease or defect arose after entry.
Thus an alien properly screened and properly admitted may be deported for the
misfortune of mental illness or loss of work through no fault of his own. This is
blaming the immigrant for the shortcomings of the immigration system. Such a
rule is unconscionable and would appear to violate the holdings in Graham v.
Richardson.
The fourth category sets out a range of offenses, with no statute of limita-
tions, for which deportation is proper, if committed at any time after entry. In
most of these cases deportation is an added penalty, one applicable only to aliens.
Such a penalty raises clear equal protection problems. Since aliens are a suspect
classification, any such additional penalty must be based upon a compelling
governmental interest as well as bearing a reasonable relationship to a legitimate
purpose. Fundamentally, this section apears to be based upon prejudice against
aliens, a prejudice that they are more likely than citizens to be gangsters, prosti-
tutes, Communists, spies, saboteurs, and drug addicts. It is, presumably, this
special danger from aliens, even those who may have entered the country as in-
fants, which is the basis for imposing deportation in addition to normal criminal
penalties. Such a statute is simple discrimination against aliens where there is no
statute of limitations based upon length of residence in the United States or where
deportation is not based on violations in obtaining entry. There may be cases
where there is some compelling state interest which would require the expulsion
of a legally admitted resident alien. One example is the expulsion or internment
of enemy aliens. There may be other circumstances where deportation would be
proper also, but the greatest part of present deportation law seems to have no
basis in any compelling state interest which would justify the imposition of such a
drastic additional penalty.
Other constitutionally guaranteed rights are also denied a resident alien in
deportation proceedings. The alien has only minimal rights of due process and
may be deported under an ex post facto law.20 ' Again, it is important to dis-
tinguish between aliens who entered illegally and those who are legal residents.
Illegal entrants form the great bulk of those expelled from the United States.2"9
Illegal aliens are deprived of no right and properly may be expelled upon an ad-
207 One problem, however, is that the five year period is computed from the time of last
entry made into the country, though this might have been a brief visit. United States ex rel.
Volpe v. Smith, 289 U.S. 422 (1933); Lapina v. Williams, 232 U.S. 78 '(1914). See Maslow,
supra note 194, at 327-29.
208 Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954) ; Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
209 In 1972, 467,193 aliens were expelled. Of these, 450,927 were illkgal entrants who
were required to leave, while 16,266 were deportees. The great majorfty of illegal aliens are
Mexican. 1972 IMxMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE ANN. REP. 76 (1972).
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ministrative hearing. This standard of due process should not be extended to the
deportation of legally resident aliens however. If equal protection for the alien
is to have meaning, an adjudication on the issue of whether he is to lose his right
of residence should require that criminal standards of due process be applied.
These standards would require arrest only upon probable cause or judicial war-
rant, right of bail, freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, and right of
counsel at all important stages of the proceedings.10 None of these rights is now
assured the alien in proceedings to deport.
IV. Conclusion
Immigrants throughout our history have made important contributions to
American society; the United States is a nation of immigrants, a Nation of na-
tions. One of our proudest national symbols is the Statue of Liberty, a symbol
of the American faith in the strength of our institutions and in the human poten-
tial of all races and peoples to contribute to those institutions. But the Statue of
Liberty also symbolizes the decline of this faith. Its dedication in 1886 was four
years after the first restrictions on Chinese immigration. It was six years before
the passage of the first deportation law since the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798.
Later legislation has often been racially discriminatory and has been used to
attack native political radicalism. Domestically, resident aliens were subjected to
increasing restrictions on employment and other rights. All of these restrictions
appear to be based on a simple prejudice that many foreigners seeking entry into
the U.S. are racially or morally inferior, subversive, or of low intelligence.
Further, they are based on the fear that foreigners would not adopt American
ways. This attitude was once naively expressed: "We are going to love every
foreigner who really becomes an American, and all others we are going to ship
back home."21
Many states permitted the alien to vote in the nineteenth century; and,
indeed, political rights were advertised by the states as inducements for settle-
ment.21 Resident aliens no longer have the right to vote, and thus have little
influence to prevent discriminatory legislation. Before the decisions in Takahashi
and Graham they also were given little protection by the courts. These decisions
represent a recognition of the alien's vulnerability to prejudice and discrimination.
The illogic of restrictions against aliens is emphasized by the admission
procedures under the 1965 Act. To be admitted, an immigrant must either be
a close relative of a U.S. citizen or permanent resident, or be certified as filling
a job which a resident is not willing or able to fill, or qualify as a refugee. He
must also be mentally competent, free of contagious disease, and literate. Immi-
gration under this system is limited to a fixed yearly total. It is difficult to per-
ceive a justification for discriminatory legislation against anyone admitted under
these standards. Nevertheless, present immigration law is riddled with other
210 See Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Naturalization Power, 80 YAzE L.J. 769,
797 (1971).
211 P. TAYLOR, THE DISTANT MAGNET 251 (1971).
212 Id. at 73.
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examples of discrimination. It has been criticized as undemocratic and as a
betrayal of our American traditions.213 Its technicalities have bred much in-
justice. 214 It has been justly criticized as portraying us to the world as harsh,
vindictive, and repressive. Much of the reason for the unfairness of this law can
be found in the acquiescence of the courts to government actions which would be
unconstitutional if applied to citizens and in the unwillingness of the courts to
extend constitutional protections to aliens, the strangers in our midst.
Daniel Grosh
213 Wasserman, The Undemocratic, Illogical and Arbitrary Immigration Laws of the United
States, 3 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER 254 (1969).
214 J. KENNEDY, A NATION OF IMMIGRANTS 116-17 (rev. ed. 1964.)
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